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COMMENTS
PATENTS AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS-
THE SUPREME COURT MAKES A DECISION
The issues surrounding patent protection for computer programs,
or "software" as they are referred to in the computer industry, have
been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years.' The
United States Supreme Court, with its recent decision in the case of
Gottschalk v. Benson,2 added a new chapter to the controversy con-
cerning the protection of computer programs through patent laws.
In this case the Court for the first time dealt with the problems
involved in legal protection for programs as invented items, an area
of controversy which has been characterized as the "most perplexing
and serious problem ever to confront patent and copyright law policy
makers."3
In order to facilitate a discussion of the legal dispute which has
emerged over the inclusion of programs as patentable items and in
order to understand both previous lower court decisions and the
Supreme Court's ruling in Gottschalk v. Benson, it is necessary to gain
some basic knowledge of computers, computer programs and the
computer industry.
Computers, Programs and the Computer Industry
A computer, often referred to as "hardware" in the industry, is
basically a general problem-solving device. It operates by "accepting
data, performing prescribed operations on the data, and supplying the
results of these operations."4 One form of computer, the digital com-
puter, deals with data in the form of numerical representations. An
1 For a good general background concerning patent protection for computer
programs see, Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be Patentable?, 68
CoLum. L. REv. 241 (1968); Compu, ns-IN-LAw INs rrTUE NATIONAL LAW CEN-
TER, GEO. WASH. UNIv., LAW OF SOFTWARE (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968
PnocEEm ns]; CO M UsraS-IN-LAw INSTrruTE NATIONAL LAW CENTER, GEo.
WASH. UNIv., LAW OF SoFrwARE: CHANGING STRucTuRE AND INVESTMENT PAT-
TERNS iN THE Co~nUTER INDusTRY OCCASIONED BY SOFTWARE LEGAL DEVELOP-
MENTs (1969) [hereinfater cited as 1969 PnOCEEDINGS]; and PATENT REsouRcEs
GRoUP, SOFTWARE PROTECrMON BY TRADE SECRET CONTRACT PATENT (1969).
2409 U.S. 68 (1972).
3 Buckman, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Programs, 51 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 135 (1969).
4 ABA STANDING Comm. ON LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, COMPUraS AND TIM
LAw 186 (2d ed. 1969). This book serves as a good handbook on computers for
the attorney.
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analog computer, on the other hand, operates with data represented
as physical quantities and computes by "measuring" these quantities
rather than by "counting" numbers as the digital computer does.5
The computer program may be thought of as "instructions" to
the computer on how to solve a program. Actually the program
controls the transfer of data within the computer, directing the per-
formance and function of the mechanism.6 This control element could
be supplied by actual physical rewiring of the computer each time a
particular problem is to be solved, but this would be inefficient and
costly. Through the introduction of a computer program the com-
puter can be automatically "rewired."7 Thus, the program is more
than mere "instructions" since it in effect restructures the computer
to solve a particular problem by varying circuits and so on, without
requiring an actual manual rewiring of the machine. These functions
of computer programs have led to their characterization as "instant
hardware" or as automatic "softwiring" 9 for computers since the
introduction of a program essentially redesigns the computing mech-
anism.
As a reflection of the importance of computers in the modem
world, it is estimated that as of 1972 there were some 80,000 com-
puters in operation in this country and that by 1975 this number
would reach 140,000, involving a work force of 2,230,000 Americans."0
The value of the computers and programs now in operation has
been estimated to be in the area of $30 billion."
The business of developing computer programs has, like the
computer hardware industry, grown rapidly. Unlike the "hardware"
industry, which is dominated by large corporations, such as IBM,
the "software" industry is composed of many small concerns which
specialize in the production of programs. The amount spent by com-
5 Id. at 26-34. See also Puckett, The Limits of Copyright and Patent Protection
for Computer Programs, 16 ASCAP CoPYIGHr LAw SvyiosIum 81, 136 (1968).
621 CATE. U.L. REV. 181, 182 (1971).
7 Puckett, supra note 5, at 137. See also, Kayton, Patent Protectability of
Software: Background and Current Law, in 1968 PRoca INGs at B-25.
8 Kayton, supra note 7, at B-35, 36.
9 Jacobs, Patentable Machines-Systems Embodiable in Hardware or Software,
1968 PROCEEDINGs at B-77-81. Other important articles by Jacobs in this field in-
clude: Computer Technology (Hardware and Software): Some Legal Implications
for Anti-trust, Copyright and Patents, 1972 RwrGzas J. OF Comurx s AND T
LAw 50; and Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 6
(1965). These articles along with Kayton's article, supra note 7, provide a good
insight into the technological nature of computer programs and how they relate to
the present patent statutes.
'OAllen, The Computer Bandit, The Louisville Courier-Journal and Times,
March 18, 1973, (Magazine), at 11. This article discusses another significant
problem in the computer industry-the stealing of computer information.
11 Supra note 6, at 183.
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puter users for programs is quite high. In the next several years it
has been estimated that up to $15 billion will be expended by users
for programs.'
2
Despite the rapid growth of the software industry, certain problems
have arisen.'8 The cost of developing a program is often high.
Further, because of the need for new and innovative programs, there
is a demand for continuing investment in program production, an
investment which would become worthless however if the programs
developed could not be marketed. The marketability of a program,
in turn, depends largely upon a company's ability to control its
distribution and use. This need for control results in a demand for
some form of legal protection which would serve to promote com-
petition and efficient utilization of programming resources.14
The majority of those offering opinions, from IBM to the smaller
software houses, and from the Patent Office to the American Bar
Association, seem to agree that some form of protection is essential.15
Dispute arises, however, when the discussion turns to the subject of
what sort of protection should be offered for programs. The points
of controversy center in the availability of patent protection, the
adequacy of other forms of protection now available in the form of
trade secret law16 and copyright law,17 and the need to devise a new
form of protection specifically tailored to computer programs.
12 ComumuTnwoRLD, Nov. 29, 1972, at 4.
13 For a good general outline of the problems and need for protection, see
Bender, supra note 1.
14 Bender, supra note 1, at 245-47.
15 For IBM's attitude see Doud, The Business of Software and its Protection,
1969 PROCEEDINGS at P-1. IBM has not supported patent protection for programs
in general. Rather, it has proposed a special form of protection which is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 128-24 infra.
Another area of conflict with IBM is in the area of so-called "tie in" arrange-
ments. In such agreements, IBM contracts with computer purchasers to supply
programs thus cutting off software companies from potential sales. It has been
claimed that this violates antitrust law. See Buckman, supra note 3, at 140-42.
10 For information about trade secret protection for programs, which is now
the most widely employed sort of protection, see Bender, Trade Secret Protection
of Software, 38 GEo. WAste. L. REv. 909 (1970); and Bender, Post-Adkins Trade
Secret Protection of Software, 1970 RUTERs J. OF CoMn'TRs AND THE LAW 5.
See also Orenbach, Trade Secrets and the Patent Law, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 638
(1970). Cases of importance include Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969);
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); and Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442
F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
One of the main problems with trade secret protection is that, by its nature,
it requires that a program be kept secret, which can be difficult and which can
hinder the general growth of the software industry.
17 For information about copyright protection for programs, see Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 H.&uv. L. REV. 281 (1970); Galbi, Proposals for New
(Continued on next page)
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Patent Protection-The Policy Controversy
The source of federal patent power is found in Article I of the
United States Constitution which provides that Congress has the
power, "to promote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries."' The objectives
of the patent system, as formulated in Title 35 of the United States
Code, are: 1) the development of a uniform patent system, 2) the
encouragement of invention and 3) the preservation of free compe-
tition and public access by limiting what can be patented and for
how long.' 9 The law provides for seventeen years of patent protection.
The protection offered is for the item itself and for the underlying
concepts involved and prevents those who independently make the
same discovery from infringing upon the original inventor's patent.
The law grants such protection, however, only for those inventions
which meet a strict standard of novelty and utility and only in ex-
change for a full disclosure of the invention.20
Those who support the idea of patent protection for computer
programs feel that it is the most appropriate form of protection
considering the technological nature of programs and their particular
function as "instant hardware."21 Also, it is felt that this form of
protection would most satisfactorily meet the basic needs of the
computer program industry by providing an inclusive system of
protection and thereby encouraging investment, invention, compe-
tition and disclosure. 22
In opposition to these assertions, several arguments are made. In
1966, the President's Commission on the Patent System specifically
recommended the exclusion of computer programs from patent
coverage.23 In the Commission's view, because of the number of
programs developed and their complexity, the Patent Office was not
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'r 280
(1970); Iskrant, The Impact of the Multiple Forms of Computer Programs on
Their Adequate Protection by Copyright, 18 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAw SYMwosrum
92 (1970); and Puckett, The Limits of Copyright and Patent Protection for Com-
puter Programs, 16 ASCAP COPYRiGHT LAW Smposi m 81 (1968).
18 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
19 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 876 U.S. 225, 228-31 (1964).
2085 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154, 271 (1970).
21 See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
22 Bender, supra note 1, at 245-48.
23 PRESmENT'S COMMvuISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PRoMoTE THE PROG-
RESS OF USEFUL ARTS 12, 13 (1966). [hereinafter cited as PREsmENs'S Comnmns-
SION REPORT].
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equipped to handle applications for program patents. The major
difficulties arose, the Commission felt, in the classification of programs
as well as in the area of prior art since many programs had been
developed in the past which the Patent Office would not have on
file. Further, because the program industry had progressed without
patent protection and because copyright protection for programs was
available, the Commission concluded that patent protection simply
was not needed. The Commission's recommendation resulted in
an attempt in 1967 to statutorily exclude computer programs from
patent coverage, but the effort failed.
24
It has been argued that to allow patents on programs, rather than
fostering growth, would provide the basis for monopolistic control
of the software industry.25 Still other arguments have been made
that the patent system's strict standards would prevent the majority
of programs from being covered,26 that the cost of obtaining a patent
(around $1,000) is prohibitively high, that the time required to
secure a patent (2/-3 years) is so long that many programs would
be obsolete by the time the patent was obtained and that it would
be difficult to detect infringement.27 Finally, it is felt that the patent
system is inappropriate to deal with programs. The view is that the
central objective of the patent system is to encourage invention,
not merely protect investments, yet the software industry's chief
desire is to protect its investments. If protection is to be available it
should be specifically designed, many say, to meet this particular in-
vestment objective.
28
These arguments constitute the policy controversy for and against
patent protection for computer programs. The law as it related to
the protection of programs prior to the Benson decision reflected this
policy controversy. The Patent Office initially took the position that
patent coverage for programs was not available, but the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals reached a different conclusion.
24S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 106 (1967). "A plan of action or set of operating instructions, in whatever
form presented, to cause a controllable data processor or computer to perform
selected operations shall not be patentable."25 Baker, An Antitrust Look at Software Patents and Restraints, 1969 PRo-
CEEDINcs, at I-1, 1-7; Comment, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the
Patent and Copyright Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1541 (1968).
20 1969 PocEEDnGs at P-10.
2 7 Supra note 6, at 189-90. It should be noted however that, while in general
it takes nearly 3 years to get a patent, in certain areas of priority such as air
pollution inventions, the Patent Office can process an application in 6 to 8 months.
While this is admittedly a special area, it indicates that the patent system is not
inherently incapable of more rapid operation. FoasEs, March 15, 1973, at 14.
28 1969 PRoc miNms at P-12-13.
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The Law Before Benson
Patent law offers a classification system for those items for which
protection is available. The two classes into which a program
theoretically could fall are the "process" category or, when combined
with a computer, in the "machine" or apparatus category. 29 The
Patent Office from 1966 to 1969 said that computer programs were
not within the scope of these statutory classes and thus were un-
patentable. In 1966 the Office proposed,30 and in 1968 adopted, a set
of guidelines which embodied its position that programs "whether
defined in the form of process or apparatus, shall not be patentable."31
The basis for the Office's view was the judicially developed "mental
steps" doctrine, discussed later, and an assumption that the statutory
term "process" covered only such processes as produced physical
transformation of substances, chemical alterations and similar changes
in physical matter. The problem with classifying a program as
patentable subject matter centered, the Office felt, around the pro-
gram's mathematical nature. The Patent Office concluded that a
process which could be performed by purely mental operation did
not constitute patentable material since abstract "thought" is un-
patentable. This was the rule, the Office believed, despite the fact
that the process claimed in the patent application covered only a
machine and not a mental implementation of the process. If the
process could be carried out mentally it could not be patented even
though the patent claim might cover only a machine's performance of
the process.32 This "mental steps" rule is the result of a series of
patent cases.33 Two of the cases, In re Abrams34 and In re Yuan35
form the foundation for the Patent Office's analysis and clearly illustrate
the "mental steps" rule.
In Abrams, the patent claims related to a method or process for
29 "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition, of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). "The term 'process' means process, art
or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material." 85 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1970).
3 829 O.G. PAT. OFF. 1-3 (1966).
31855 O.G. PAT. OFF. 829 830 (1968).
32 Id. See also Brenner, The Future of Computer Programs in the U.S. Patent
Office, 1968 PROCEEDiucs at B-1. Brenner was Commissioner of Patents and out-
lines in h:s article the Patent Office viewpoint.
33 Cases of importance to the Patent Office view include: Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1944); Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d
58 (9th Cir. 1932); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951); and In re Yuan,
188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
34 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
35 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
[Vol. 62.
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petroleum prospecting. The claims were rejected on the ground that
they failed to define a process covered within the patent statutes. In
essence, the objection was that "the claims which constitute the
heart of the invention are purely mental in character."36 The problem
was that the applicant disclosed no means for performing certain of
the steps in the process except through human thought and analysis.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in affirming the rejection,
held to the view that a process, if it included "purely mentar' steps
performed only through human action, was unpatentable.
The Yuan case concerned a claim for a mathematical procedure
for the construction of an airfoil. The Patent Office refused the claim
since it constituted purely mental steps which did not fall within the
scope of patentable material. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, in reviewing this rejection, examined closely the "mental
steps" rule. The court concluded that it was thoroughly established
that patent claims, such as Yuan's, which required human mental
judgment and involvement, did not form patentable processes.37 As a
result of these cases, the Patent Office concluded that any process
claims which could be read in such a manner as to include mental
steps were outside statutory coverage and unpatentable. Hence,
programs were not patentable.
Further, based upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of
Cochrane v. Deener,38 the Patent Office felt that the statutory term
"process" referred only to processes operating on substances to pro-
duce some form of physical or chemical change. Since a computer
program does not cause a substance to alter its physical character,
the Patent Office concluded that it did not satisfy the Cochrane rule.
The Cochrane case was an action based upon an alleged patent
infringement. The patents in question concerned an improved process
for sifting flour, the first claim being for the general process and the
others for machinery improvements. The issue was whether the
defendant infringed on the patents if he used different machinery to
perform substantially the same process as that patented by the plaintiff.
The Court, deciding that this constituted an infringement since the
machinery employed to carry out the patented process was im-
material, discussed what constitutes a process:
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is an act or series of acts, performed upon the sub-
36 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
3 7 In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 877, 380-82 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
38 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
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ject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing.39
Based upon this analysis, the Patent Office concluded that "intangible"
processes could not be patented.40
As to a patent claim for a program as part of an "apparatus" or
machine, the Patent Office felt that if the innovation of the apparatus
was in the program alone, then an apparatus patent had to be denied,
based upon the "mental steps" doctrine. It would be improper, the
Office asserted, to issue a patent on an apparatus which did no more
than perform an unpatentable process.41 As a result, efforts to patent
programs through apparatus claims, like process claims, were re-
jected by the Patent Office.
With its position clearly established, the Patent Office supported
the 1967 effort to specifically exclude programs from patent coverage
by way of legislative action.42 After a time however, the Commissioner
of Patents relented and advanced the idea that, while patent protection
was not open to computer programs, some new form of protection,
structured especially for programs, was necessary.43 The Patent Of-
fice's rejection of patent applications for computer programs was
clearly not based solely on an analysis of patent law. While the Office
favored some form of protection for software, it feared that to open
the doors of patent protection to programs would injure the operation
of the Patent Office. Again, the reason for this view was the antici-
pated difficulties in classifying, searching and investigating pro-
gram applications without established files and records. 44
A series of cases beginning in 1969 brought the Patent Office's
legal position under the scrutiny of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.45 This court, advancing the view that programming could
constitute a patentable process or apparatus, rejected the Patent
Office's theories. The court thus opened the way to patent protection
39 Id. at 788.
40 855 O.G. PAT. OFF. 829, 829-30 (1968).
41 Id. at 830.
42 S the testimony of Edward Brenner, the Commissioner of Patents, in
Hearings on S. 1042 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 137 (1967).
43 See Brenner's testimony in Hearings on H.R. 5924 Before Subcomm. no. 3
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 532 (1968). See also
Brenner, The Future of Computer Programs in the U.S. Patent Office, 1968 PRo-
cy-incs at B-1.4 4 PnRESmENT'S CommissIoN REPORT, supra note 23.
45 In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart,
417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); and In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 modified, 415
F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
[Vol. 62
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for programs. The first and most influential of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals decisions came in a 1969 case, In re Prater.46 The
patent applicants in this case claimed they had developed processes
and apparatus relating to computerized mass spectrographic analysis
of a mixture of various known gases. The spectrograph is a trace or
line consisting of a series of peaks. By selecting various peaks, deriving
equations for each and solving for the unknown element, the propor-
tions of the gases in the mixture can be determined. The patent
claims set forth the applicants' discovery that the equations giving the
most accurate results were those which had the largest determinant
and also disclosed the necessary apparatus to carry the process
through machine implementation-a computer.47
The Patent Office, while acknowledging the novelty of the ap-
plicants' discovery, rejected the patent claims on the theory that the
process claims did not comply with United States Code, Title 35, §§
101 and 112 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as U.S.C.]. The objection
was that the claimed processes could be performed by purely mental
calculations and as such the processes constituted unpatentable "men-
tal steps" under section 101.48 The Patent Office concluded that it
was irrelevant that the claimed processes were performed within a
computer since they could be done mentally and did not involve any
transformation of a substance.49 The rejection was based upon con-
cepts drawn from the Abrams, Yuan and Cochrane cases. 50
Further, the Patent Office said that even if it were assumed that
such processes were within the scope of statutory coverage, the patent
claims were still unacceptable, since by covering purely human thought
processes in their parent claims, the applicants had failed to particu-
larly point out and distinctly claim only the computer-implemented
processes they claimed as their invention as required in section 112.51
The Office's view was that by including purely mental steps, which
were unpatentable, the claims were not sufficiently specific although
the applicants asserted they did not wish to patent anything other
than the computer-implemented processes. 52
46 415 F.2d 1378 modified, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
47 Id. at 1395-98.
4835 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
49 See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra.
50 Cochrane v. Denner, 94 U.S. 780 (1877); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165
(C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
5135 U.S.C. § 112 (1970) provides:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.
52415 F.2d at 1898-99.
19741
KENTucCy LAw JouBNAL[
Finally, the Patent Office refused the apparatus claim on the theory
that given the applicants' unpatentable discovery, it would be obvious
to any skilled programmer how to program a computer to perform
the desired operations. The novelty of the apparatus was in the
unpatentable process; and, as a result, the Patent Office felt that the
machinery to carry out what could not be patented could not itself
be covered by the patent law.
53
These rejections embodied all the essential elements of the
theories upon which the Patent Office had established its policy
toward applications for program patents. In the initial Prater deci-
sion,54 by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Judge Smith
examined the substance of the Office's position and rejected it. The
court first looked to the Abrams case and the development of the
"mental steps" rule. In examining Abrams, the court concluded that
the applicant's failure resulted from his inability to disclose any
means, other than mental process, by which to perform several of the
steps in the claimed process.55 The Prater application was found to be
significantly different, however, since it contained a disclosure of
computer apparatus for performing the process claimed by the appli-
cants without requiring any human intervention or involvement. The
court stated:
This distinction from Abrams leads us to our present holding which
is that patent protection for a process disclosed as being a sequence
or combination of steps, capable of performance without human
intervention and directed to an industrial technology-a "useful
art" within the intendment of the Constitution-is not precluded
[from statutory coverage] by the mere fact that the process could
alternatively be carried out by mental steps.
56
The court said that with regard to processes which did not require
human involvement that it could "[flind nothing to indicate an intent
of Congress or the courts to deny patent protection to process claims
merely because they could alternatively be read on a process per-
formed through the mind... ."sT The court thus distinguished earlier
rulings such as Abrams and rejected the Patent Office's conclusions
founded on these cases.
Secondly, the court examined the Cochrane case and the theory
that a statutory process has to deal with physical substances.5s Judge
53 Id. at 1399.
54In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
55 Id. at 1385.
56 Id. at 1889.
57 Id.
58 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
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Smith asserted that Cochrane did not establish any rule concerning
what constitutes a statutory process. 59 That case, in his view, did no
more than demonstrate that a process patent was not restricted to any
particular machinery. In other decisions, the Supreme Court had, he
felt, clearly indicated that processes not producing any physical
alterations were patentable.60
Two Supreme Court decisions of particular significance in relation
to whether a patentable process must operate to produce physical
transformation are O'Reilly v. Morse61 and The Telephone Cases. 6
Each of these cases dealt with electrical processes producing no
physical or chemical alterations as such. The Morse case concerned
an alleged infringement of Samuel Morse's telegraph patent. His first
patent claim was for the use of electricity for the purpose of tele-
graphic communication in the manner set forth in the description
of the invention.63 The Court sustained the patent claim since it did
not cover in general the communicative use of electricity but was
limited to a particular manner of using it. The Court did not mention
the fact that the process claimed by Morse produced no transforma-
tion of a physical substance. While finding most of Morse's patent
claims valid, the Court did reject his eighth claim, finding that it read
so broadly as to cover all uses of electricity as a communicative force
beyond those uses outlined in the description of the invention. The
conclusion was that this claim was too broad and inclusive to be
permitted by law since it would, in effect, give Morse a patent on the
communicative use of electricity and thus inhibit future discoveries. 4
The Telephone Cases dealt with Alexander Bell's patent on the
telephone. The infringement controversy centered on his fifth patent
claim which was for the method and apparatus for telephone com-
munication. 5 The Court concluded that the Morse decision supported
Bell's claims. As long as the use of electricity for communication was
implemented through a particular process, that process could be
patented. 6 While it might eventually result that there was no other
method of employing electricity to transmit sound than Bell's process,
the Court felt that his claims were clear enough not to discourage
future invention in this area and were thus allowable.67 Again, al-
t9 415 F.2d at 1887-88.
6o Id. at 1388.
6156 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
62126 U.S. 1 (1887).
63 56 U.S. at 85.
64 Id. at 112-13.
65 126 U.S. at 531.
66 d. at 534.
67 Id. at 535.
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though the claimed process did not involve physical transformation,
this was no bar to its inclusion within the statutory classes provided
in the patent laws. As a result of such prior decisions, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals in Prater overturned the Patent Office
view, based primarily upon the Cochrane case, that a patentable
process has to produce a physical change of substance or form.
Lastly, as to the apparatus claim, the court in Prater concluded
that the "mental steps" rule was inapplicable. The court further said
that a test of "obviousness" could not be based upon the idea that,
given the applicants' discovery, any skilled programmer could formu-
late a program to perform the operation. Without the discovery the
program would not be obvious, and the test had to be based upon
obviousness at the time of the discovery.6 8
This decision caused consternation within the Patent Office since
it rejected the basic elements of the Office's position regarding com-
puter programs. An application for rehearing was filed. The court
accepted the application and proceeded to modify its original deci-
sion.69 The modification, however, did not alter the basic tenets of
Judge Smith's opinion.
In its decision on rehearing, the court reiterated its previous
analysis of the "mental steps" rule as not precluding from statutory
classification a process described as fully machine implementable
even though the process could in some form be performed mentally.
The court also approved Judge Smith's evaluation of the Cochrane
decision and his finding that processes not involving physical alterations
could be patented.70
However, while upholding this analysis, the court reversed its
decision and rejected the applicants' process claims. The reasoning
behind this was that while the applicants sought only to patent a
computer process, the patent claims were stated in such a manner
as to include human mental steps. The claims were thus not specific
and distinct within the meaning of U.S.C., Title 35, § 112.71 While
rejecting the patent claims as too broad, it is most important to note
that the court did reaffirm its earlier views. Most importantly, the
court stated in a footnote:
No reason is now apparent to us why, based on the Constitution,
statute, or case law, apparatus and process claims broad enough to
encompass the operation of a programmed general-purpose digital
68 415 F.2d at 1389, 1405-06.69 In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1893 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
70 Id. at 1401-06.
71 Id. at 1403-05.
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computer are necessarily unpatentable. In one sense a general-
purpose digital computer may be regarded as but a storeroom of
parts and/or electrical components. But once a program has been
introduced, the general-purpose digital computer becomes a
special-purpose digital computer (i.e., a specific electrical circuit
with or without electro-mechanical components) which, along
with the process by which it operates, may be patented subject, of
course, to the requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.
Based on the present law, we see no other reasonable conclusion.72
The court accepted here the view of programs as "instant hardware"
or "softwiring"73 and as such included them within the statutory
classifications of process or apparatus.
The initial result of this decision was that the Patent Office with-
drew the guidelines it had issued concerning programs and elected
to deal with programs on a case by case basis.7 4 The Commissioner
of Patents indicated that due to the decision the Patent Office would
consider patent applications for programs on the basis of the merits
of the particular invention claimed, rather than refusing consideration
for such claims based upon the theories discarded in Prater.5
Reaction to the decisions was mixed. It was hailed as "the turning
point in the development of the patent law as it is applied to the
subject of digital computer programming," which had "inaugurated a
new era in the patenting of data processing inventions." 76 Many
found the court's analysis of the law good and supported its general
views.77 The understanding was that, while patent coverage for
programs might result in operational difficulties for the Patent Office,
such problems were matters of legislative rather than judicial concern
and that in terms of present law, patent protection for programs
should be available. Others felt that the decision was too broad in
scope and saw it as forecasting considerable difficulty for the Patent
72 Id. at 1403 n.29.
73 See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
74 34 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1969).
75 Schuyler, Protecting Property in Computer Software, 1969 PnocFD INGs at
H-1, H-3.76 Nimtz, The Patentability of Computer Programs, 1970 RuTGrms J. oF Com-
PuTnis AND THE LAv 38, 40, 42.77 Brothers & Gumaldi, In re Prater and Patent Reform Proposals: Debugging
the Patent Office's Administration of Computer Program Applications, 51 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 581 1969); Jacobs, Computer Technology (Hardware and Software);
Some Legal Implications for Antitrust, Copyrights and Patents, Fall 1970 RuTGERs
J. oF CoipuTRns AND THE LAw 50; Sutton, The 'Mental Steps' Doctrine: A Critical
Analysis in the Light of Prater and Wei, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 479 (1970); Com-
ment, Mathematics, Computers and In re Prater: The Medium and the Message, 58
GEo. LJ. 391 (1969).
Sutton in his lengthy and excellent examination of the "mental steps" rule
concludes that the C.C.P.A. decision in Prater was a very good decision, correctly
limiting the "rule." Sutton, supra at 520-21.
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Office in classifying, researching and verifying patent applications
for programs.78
The Prater ruling was followed by a line of patent cases in which
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals developed and expanded
its analysis of the "mental steps" doctrine.79 The Patent Office had
considered the entire series of patent applications which were the
subjects of these cases prior to the Prater decision and had in its
rejections followed the basic analysis employed when it had rejected
the application of Prater. While this series of decisions by the Patent
Appeals court is of considerable importance, an examination of each
ruling would be outside the scope of this paper. Certain important
points should be noted however. The Musgrave case 80 went beyond
Prater in its rejection of the "mental steps" rule. The court no longer
required that a process, to be considered within the statutory scope
of patentability, be machine implementable, as long as it was within
the "technological arts." The decision also required a patent applicant
to disclose less information about his invention than previously was
required. A number of authorities have been critical of these changes.8s
Another important development in this series of cases was that the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reached the conclusion that
claims had to be read in terms of what they reasonably might cover
considering the wording used and not in terms of what they might
cover with a hyper-technical reading.82
By the time the Patent Appeals court heard the Benson case
83 it
had discarded the theories upon which the Patent Office had rejected
the application of Benson and Tabbot. What made their patent
application unique, however, was that the process they claimed in
their application specifically covered only a computer program. While
the earlier series of cases dealt with the use of a program to perform
specific industrial or scientific functions, the Benson application was
"the first . . . in which a program for a computer was clearly dis-
closed and claimed as the invention."84
78 Buckman, supra note 3.
79 In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d
882 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bern-
hart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).80 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
81 Iandioro, Which Wei Did They Go?, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Socy 712 (1971);
ABA 1971 Comm. REPORTS, SEc. OF PATENTS, TRADEMAmm AND COPYMrIr LAw,
CoMM~. NO. 408, SuBcomm. C, 277.82 In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
8 3 In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
84 Iandioro, supra note 81, at 712.
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The Benson Case
In 1963, Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot filed an application for
a patent claiming a method for converting binary-coded decimal
numerals into pure binary numerals in a general purpose digital
computer.85 Benson and Tabbot had discovered a method for per-
forming this operation within a computer and claimed a machine-
implemented process for utilizing their discovery."" This computer
process was not directed to any particular industrial operation but
consisted essentially of a programming technique designed to enhance
the operation of the computer as it might be employed for any prac-
tical purpose.
The Patent Office rejected the claims based upon one theory-that
being performable through mental calculation, they were outside the
limits of patentability.8 7 Though not part of the original rejection,
the Patent Office also attempted on appeal to justify rejection of
the patent application on the theory that it lacked the necessary
specificity. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however,
found the patent claims within the statutory classification and suf-
ficiently specific.
Citing Prater and several subsequent cases, the court noted the
unique nature of the claims in this case. "The claims.., are directed
solely to the art of data-processing itself whereas in most of the above
cases some subsidiary or additional art was involved."8s What was
significant, the judges felt, was that "[a]ll of the above cases and the
present case have in common.., the fact that they are the outgrowth
of a blanket Patent Office policy .... The decision here for review is a
typical product of its time"8 9 The Patent Office had refused the
claims prior to the Prater ruling and had based its position on theories
which had been discarded in that case.
The controversy on appeal centered specifically on two of the
85 Most computers perform their operations using binary numerals, a system of
representation using only I or 0 in contrast to the decimal system based on ten
numerical representations. It is necessary, in utilizing the computer, to convert
from decimal notation to the binary form. The general practice is to make this
conversion in two steps. First the decimal numeralis converted to a binary-coded-
decimal (BCD), a decimal notation in which the individual decimal digits are
each represented by a group of binary digits, e.g., 75 is represented by 0111 0101.
Then the BCD form is converted to a pure binary form of notation. It is to this
second step of the conversion process that Benson and Tabbot's discovery related.
86 441 F.2d at 682-84.
87 Id. at 684-85.
88 Id. at 686.
89 Id.
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patent claims, the eighth and the thirteenth.90 The court felt that the
eighth claim, by its own clear language, was specifically limited to a
computer-implemented process. It was irrelevant that in some form
the human mind might be capable of performing a similar process.
Judge Rich, speaking for a unanimous court, expressed the view that
the only reasonable way to read the claim was as applied to a digital
computer. The eighth claim ". . . covers only a machine implemented
process and apparatus for carrying it out has been disclosed. The
process can be carried out with no intervention by a human being."91
The court also rejected the contention that the claimed process was
"menta" in character since it dealt with numerical representations.
"Cash registers, bookkeeping machines, and adding machines also
work with numbers but this has never been considered a ground for
taking them out of the 'machine' category of section lOl."92
90 Claim eight reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form
into binary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift
register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until
there is a binary 1' in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary "1" in said second position of said
register,
(4) adding a binary "1" to the first position of said register,
5 shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
6 adding a "1" to said first position, and
7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in
preparation for a succeeding binary '1 in the second position
of said register. Id. at 683.
Claim thirteen reads:
A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal num-
ber representations into binary number representations comprising the
steps of
(1) testing each binary digit position i, beginning with the least
significant binary digit position, of the most significant decimal
digit representation for a binary "0" or a bin '1,;
(2) if a binary "0" is detected, repeating step (1) fr the next
least significant binary digit position of said most significant
decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary "1" is detected, adding a binary "1" at the (i + 1)th
and the (i + 3)th least significant binary digit positions of the
next lesser significant decimal digit representation and repeating
step (1) for the next least significant binary digit position of
said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most signifi-
c ant decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through
(3) for the next lesser significant decimal digit representation
as modified by the previous execution of steps (1) through (3);
and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least sig-
nificant decimal digit representation has been so processed.
Id. at 683-84.
' 441 F.2d at 687.
921d.
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Secondly, the court examined the rejection of the thirteenth claim,
which unlike the eighth claim, contained no specific reference to any
machine apparatus. The court said, however, that the claim had to
be read in light of the supporting disclosure of a digital computer
system.03 The thirteenth claim indicated that the outlined steps
could be performed in a computer without any human intervention.
Literally, however, the claim called for no particular apparatus and
thus, "the method within the claim can be practiced with apparatus
other than that described or with the simplest of equipment which
will enable one to provide and to manipulate [the numbers]" 94-in-
eluding a pencil and paper. In theory then the claim could cover
mental steps, but the court felt that the claimed process, in fact, had
no practical use other than as performed in a computer. Additionally,
while the process might be performed manually, the court felt that
it required no actual human judgment to follow the enumerated steps.
The judges concluded that the thirteenth claim was within the scope
of statutory coverage as a technological process not precluded by a
need for human involvement.0 5
In its decision, the court, while admitting the unique nature of
the particular patent claims, upheld the claims by operating on its
own previously established analysis. The Patent Office, anxious for
a Supreme Court determination of the issue of the patentability of
computer programs filed a petition for writ of certiorari in October
1971. In February 1972, the petition was granted,96 although there
was some question as to whether the case was a proper one for the
Court's consideration since it was concerned with the "mental steps"
rule alone, an issue long settled by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and now generally accepted.
97
The Court was asked to rule on two issues. The first was the nar-
row question of the patentability of the particular process claimed
by Benson and Tabbot.98 Secondly, the Court was asked to rule on
the broader issue of whether computer programs constitute patentable
subject matter.99 In its brief t6 the Court, the Patent Office argued
that the steps of the claimed process were unpatentable as they con-
stituted no more than a set of mental steps for performing a mathe-
93 Id.
94 Id. at 688.
95 Id.
00 Cert. granted, 405 U.S. 915.
97 landioro, supra note 81.
98 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Gottscbalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
99 Jacobs, Patents for Software Inventions-the Supreme Court's Decision, 55
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 59 (1973).
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matical procedure. 00 It was well established, the Patent Office
asserted, that mere ideas and principles are unpatentable-only the
"pragmatic application of ideas" in the form of "tangible machines,
articles of manufacture, chemical and other physical compositions and
processes for making or using such machinery, articles of manufacture
and compositions" could be patented.1' 1 As to Benson's and Tabbot's
claims, they were nothing more than "a sequence of mathematical
steps ... [which] differ only in some respects from the mental steps
that an ordinary human being could be expected to follow."'10 2
Secondly, the Patent Office asserted that the patent claims were
too broad in their nature to be patentable. It argued that the claims
were:
so abstract and sweeping as to cover any and all known and unknown
purposes or uses for this method for BCD-to-pure binary con-
version. Whether in the operation of a telephone, a railroad train,
a customer-operated cash withdrawal banking system or shep-
ardizing law reports, and whether carried out by means of any
presently known or future devised machinery. By seeking to
claim their mathematical procedure without limitation as to end
use or apparatus, respondents have placed themselves outside the
statute. 03
The Patent Office urged that the Morse case and The Telephone Cases
established the rule that if a particular process did not involve a
physical alteration of a substance, but rather dealt with "intangible
entities", such a process, to be patentable, had to be restricted: (1) to
a specific field of technology, and (2) to a particular type of appa-
ratus. 04 Because the process claimed by Benson and Tabbot was not
limited to any particular end use other than "data-processing" or to
any specific apparatus except a "digital computer" it was, in the view
of the Patent Office, unpatentable under the rule implicitly set forth
in Morse and the Telephone Cases.10 5
Thirdly, the Patent Office claimed that the programming of a
computer was no more than a conventional and unpatentable use of a
known machine, much like placing a new piano roll in a player
piano. As such, no "new use" was involved in the process claimed;
rather it was a standard use of the computer [which itself remained
unchanged] to achieve merely a new result.10 6
100 Brief for Petitioner at 17.
101 Id. at 19.
102 Id. at 20.
103 Id. at 21-22.
104 Id. at 22-24. See also Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 8-11.
105 Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 9-11.
1o Brief for the Petitioner at 26.
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Lastly, it was argued that to allow computer programs to be
patentable "would tend to undermine the present patent system
because the claims in this area cannot be adequately classified and
searched."107 The Patent Office acknowledged that one of the reasons
for denying patent coverage to programs was that, because of the
great amount of prior art in the field and because of the lack of files
on this previous work, to allow patent protection would cause sig-
nificant search and classification difficulties in the Office's operation.
These arguments were not new, except for the assertion that a rule
had been established requiring end-use and apparatus limitations on
processes involving intangible entities. This particular argument be-
comes important in the Supreme Court's final disposition of the case.
As to the "piano roll" analogy, the Court apparently rejected this
concept and held to the view that a program constituted a "soft-
wiring" or restructuring of the computer. 08
The basic line of the respondents' contentions was that their
process was a machine-implemented electrical process and that they
had "never sought to claim the mathematical relationship or tech-
nique they discovered but only the particular machine process they
derived from the mathematical discovery."10 9
As to the petitioner's argument that the patent claims did not
conform to the rule that intangible processes be restricted as to end
use and apparatus, the respondents' reply was that the government's
argument was without substance. Their claims, the respondents as-
serted, were:
confined to a process which is effected in a particular type of ap-
paratus (an electrical data processing machine), which falls within
a particular field of technology (data processing) and which has a
particular end use (conversion of BCD signals to binary signals).
The authorities petitioner cites-cases involving patent claims re-
lating to the telegraph and the telephone-do not impose the nar-
row restrictions advanced by petitioner but in fact uphold patent
claims far broader than those involved here.110
The respondents contended that the substance of the Patent Office's
argument concerning the need for specific limitations in patent
claims involving intangible elements was "founded on a misstatement
of the applicable law" and that Morse and The Telephone Cases did
not stand for any rule demanding end-use or apparatus limitations on
107 Id. at So.
108 Jacobs, supra note 99, at,60. Jacobs indicates that during oral argument
the Court stated that it found the "piano roll' analogy unacceptable.
109 Brief for the Respondents at 13.
11o Id.
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claims such as theirs. While asserting that their claims in any case
met these unfounded requirements, the respondents argued that the
applicable rule was that there did not have to be limitation to a
preferred apparatus, technological field or end-use in any process
claimed for patent protection."'
The answer to the Patent Office's mental steps argument was that
the process claim was computer-implemented and as such not pre-
cluded from patent protection by the sort of mental steps rules rejected
in the Prater case." 2 Finally, the respondents asserted that their
process, being technological in nature, was appropriate for patent law
coverage and as a result should not be excluded from the system due
to any supposed difficulty this would cause for the Patent Office.' 3
Having heard the arguments of each party, the Supreme Court
proceeded to come to a decision which reversed the process claims
of Benson and Tabbot." 4 Justice Douglas wrote the opinion in which
Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell did not participate. While
Justice Douglas did reject the patent claims of Benson and Tabbot,
his opinion is best characterized as a limited and cautious decision,
in which he was careful to avoid ruling on broad questions.
Justice Douglas stated initially that the pivotal issue of the case
was, "whether the method described and claimed is a 'process' within
the meaning of the Patent Act."115 The opinion follows the line of
reasoning advanced by the Patent Office that the process, in not
being limited as to end use, apparatus or to a particular technological
field, is unpatentable. Looking to both Morse and the Telephone Cases,
Justice Douglas stated:
Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover
both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary con-
version. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train
to verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law books
for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machine
or future-devised machine or without any apparatus." 6
Justice Douglas concurred in the Patent Office's view which dis-
tinguished processes working physical transformations and those
dealing with so-called "intangible entities" such as electricity. Citing
the cases discussed by Judge Smith in the Prater opinion, which
11 Id. at 26-29. The respondents contended that the only end limitations in
either Morse's or Bell's claims were to the invention's use for "communication",
certainly as broad, they felt, as a limitation to the use for "data processing".
112 Id. at 16-21.
113 Id. at 14-15.
314 409 U.S. at 63.
115 Id. at 64.
116 Id. at 68.
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rejected the idea that a process, to be patentable, had to deal with
substantial physical alterations, Justice Douglas apparently concluded
that while a process may deal with items other than physical trans-
formations, only tangible processes producing physical changes of
substance do not require specific end-use and apparatus limitations,
while "intangible" processes do require such restrictions.1 7 Reflecting
this idea, he stated, "Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a
different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines." 18 The implication
of this statement was that a process not involving "transformation and
reduction" must include particular machinery and end-use restrictions.
Having rejected the patent claims because they were too broad,
Justice Douglas proceeded to limit the ruling. He made it clear that
the decision was only meant to provide a resolution of the issues in
this particular case and that the Court declined to rule on the broader
issue of whether programming constituted patentable subject matter."19
Further, he did not mention the Prater decision or other Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals rulings concerned with the issues of
computer program patentability. In not doing so, it would appear he
preserved-at least in part-the analysis set forth in these decisions,
allowing for patent protection for programs connected with particular
industrial or technological uses.120 Lastly, Justice Douglas clearly
stated that it was a congressional responsibility to deal with the prob-
lem of legal protection for programs. He acknowledged the search,
classification and prior art difficulties which the Patent Office could
face and stated:
If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems
are raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for
7 Id. at 69-70. The cases cited by both Douglas and Smith include: Waxham
v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1985); Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Tilgham v.
Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). In addition Douglas discusses: Expanded Metal
Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1908) and Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
252 (1854).
118 409 U.S. at 70.
"19 Id. at 71.
We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision
precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so
hold. It is said that we have before us a p rogram for a digital computer
but extend our holding to programs for analog computers. We have, how-
ever, made clear from the start that we deal with a program only for
digital computers. It is said we freeze process patents to old tech-
nologies, leaving no room for revelations of the new, onrushing technology.
Such is not our purpose.
Some fear had been expressed prior to the decision that the Court might
write a sweeping and general opinion. ABA 1973 Comma. REPoRTs; SEC. OF
PArm'r, TRunAximA AND COPYRIGHT LAw; Commn . No. 408, Suncommv. C, 249,
253.
120 Jacobs, supra note 99.
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broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings
which canvas the wide variety of views which those operating in
this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in the
many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by the
Congress is needed.
121
In calling for a legislative resolution of this problem, Justice Douglas
chose what appears now to be the only practical solution to this
controversy, given the wide range of divergent legal and policy
arguments.
The reactions to the decision have been mixed. Morton Jacobs
expresses the view that the ruling is good in that it leaves intact
the earlier decisions of the Patent Appeals court and refuses to declare
that software in general is unpatentable. He sees the decision as a
defeat for those who have for some time attempted to get a ruling
that computer programs are unpatentable. 122 In contrast, Computer-
world expresses the conclusion that the decision is a defeat for the
software industry. "In many ways the decision is seen as a victory
for the mainframe makers industry... and a definite setback for large
users and the software industry."
123
While the careful limitations of the decision, discussed above,
lend some support to the Jacobs viewpoint, there remains some
difficulty in accepting the basis of Justice Douglas' opinion as to the
particular issues in the case-something which Jacobs does not discuss.
With no apparent legal basis other than the petitioner's contentions,
the Court seemed to accept the idea that end-use and apparatus
limitations are required in patent claims concerned with "intangible
entities", but not in process claims dealing with physical alterations
of substances. This would seem to be a new rule of law, yet the
decision does not really outline the source, meaning or limits of the
rule.
Post-Benson Development
The key questions now become if, how and when Congress will
act with regard to legal protection for computer programs. A previous
effort was made to legislatively exclude programs from patent coverage,
but the effort failed due to considerable protest from various quar-
ters.124 Now, after some judicial consideration, the problem returns to
121 409 U.S. at 73.
122 Jacobs, supra note 99, at 60.
123 COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 29, 1972, at 4, col. 3. In the next issue, the opinion
was that the Court's decision was more confusing than anything else. Co.wtrrxa-
woRLD, Dec. 6, 1972 at 47, col. 2.
124 S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 106 (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th Cong.,
lst Sess. Sec. 106 (1967).
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Congress for a final resolution. One significant problem now may be
that the large hardware manufacturers such as IBM, which have
consistently opposed patent protection for software,'125 might be able
to convince Congress to accept some special protection plan which
reflects their opposition toward protection. One such plan, the 1968
"IBM Proposal," is based upon a program registration system which
would allow protection of a basic program for ten years.126 The
IBM plan requires full disclosure of the concepts involved in the
particular program to be protected such that a skilled programmer
could develop substantially the same program as that registered. Most
significantly, the plan requires the deposit of this "conceptual descrip-
tion" with the Patent Office and provides that it be available to
anyone for immediate use (or after a short period) without his paying
any compensation. While the system would prohibit duplication or
unlawful use of the registered program itself, by means of the "con-
ceptual description" provisions, the system grants no protection for
the ideas upon which the program invention is based.
Reaction to this proposal has been unfavorable, largely because
it fails to offer the sort of protection required by the software
industry.' 27 The real need, most authorities feel, is to formulate a
new plan more in line with the requirements of program manu-
facturers and users.' 28
Since there is so much conflict as to the applicability and adequacy
of the present patent laws to properly deal with software protection,
a congressional resolution devising a system specifically tailored to
computer programs would be appropriate. Whatever form the system
might take, it should be designed to adequately serve the needs of the
software business, to protect its investments and to encourage growth
and innovation. The system should be geared to keep pace with
rapidly developing innovations in programming and should seek to
insure the optimum use of the now limited programming resources.
There is no reason why Congress cannot formulate such a plan-in
other areas such as protection for phonograph records, it has recently
done so.12 9 It would seem that computer programs, considering their
125 Jacobs, supra note 99.126 For an outline of the "IBM Proposal" and a critical analysis thereof, see
1970 ABA Comm. REPORTS; SEC. oF PATFNT, TFa.EMA1AN D CoPyiurT LAw;
Comm. No. 408, Suncomar. C, 20.
127 Id.
128 CoMPuTERwo=r, Dec. 6, 1972 (editorial) at 10, col. 1.129 In 1971 Congress, due to the extensive "pirating" of sound recordings,
amended Title 17 of the United States Code to provide a special form of copyright
protection for recordings. 17 U.S.C.A. H 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e) (Supp.
1973).
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economic significance, are deserving of at least equal congressional
attention.
Finally, the impact of the Supreme Court's decision on future
rulings by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is uncertain.
Due to the limited nature of the Court's ruling, it would seem that
patent protection for computer programs relating to specific industrial,
technological or scientific processes and end-uses may still be available
provided that the patent claims are drafted to properly conform to
the requirements set forth in Benson. For the answers to these ques-
tions however, one can only wait for future judicial pronouncements.
William E. Basanta
